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Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name
is Lisa Heinzerling. I am a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University
Law Center. After law school at the University of Chicago, I clerked for
Judge Richard Posner on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
and then for Justice William Brennan of the U.S. Supreme Court. I was an
Assistant Attorney General in the Environmental Protection Division of the
Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office for three years before coming to
Georgetown in 1993. My expertise is in environmental and administrative
law. Perhaps most pertinent to today’s hearing, I was the lead author of the
winning briefs for Massachusetts and other petitioners in Massachusetts v.
EPA.
I commend the Select Committee for convening this hearing on the
implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA and
the Administration’s response to that decision to date. In this testimony, I
discuss the following issues:
(1) EPA’s obligations and authority under the Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA;
(2) the implications of the Energy Security and Independence Act of
2007 for EPA’s obligations and authority under the Clean Air Act;
(3) EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson’s recent formal statement on
the causes and consequences of climate change;
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(4) the implications of the latter statement for regulatory programs
under the Clean Air Act; and
(5) the EPA Administrator’s obligation to make a finding (if he is not
deemed to have done so already) with respect to whether greenhouse
gases are endangering public health or welfare.
I. EPA’s Obligations and Authority Under Massachusetts v. EPA
In Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007), the Supreme Court
held that greenhouse gases are “air pollutants” within the meaning of the
Clean Air Act and that the Act gives EPA authority to regulate them. In
addition, the Court held that EPA could not refuse to exercise this authority
by citing policy considerations not enumerated in the statute or by referring
generally to the scientific uncertainty remaining with respect to climate
change.
Two aspects of the Supreme Court’s decision are particularly relevant
to this hearing. The first is the Court’s directive to EPA about what the
agency may and may not lawfully do on remand. The second is the Court’s
treatment of EPA’s argument that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(“EPCA”) precludes EPA regulation of greenhouse gases from motor
vehicles under the Clean Air Act.
The Court made several important observations about EPA’s
obligations on remand. First, it held that EPA must regulate greenhouse
gases from motor vehicles if the agency finds that they may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. (“If EPA makes a finding
of endangerment, the Clean Air Act requires the agency to regulate
emissions of the deleterious pollutant from new motor vehicles.” 127 S.Ct.
at 1462.) Second, to avoid regulating greenhouse gases, EPA must make
one of two findings. Either the agency must find that greenhouse gases may
not reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare or it must
conclude that there is not enough information to make a decision on
endangerment. (“EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines
that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides
some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its
discretion to determine whether they do…. If the scientific uncertainty is so
profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to
whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming, EPA must say
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so…. The statutory question is whether sufficient information exists to make
an endangerment finding.” 127 S.Ct. at 1462-63.) The Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA thus directs EPA to follow the scientific evidence on
climate change wherever it leads and to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
from motor vehicles if that scientific evidence shows endangerment.
Another aspect of the Court’s decision pertinent to this hearing is the
Court’s rejection of EPA’s argument that EPCA demonstrated a
Congressional intent to preclude regulation of greenhouse gases under the
Clean Air Act. In concluding that it lacked authority to regulate greenhouse
gases, EPA had explained:
Even if [greenhouse gases] were air pollutants generally subject to
regulation under the [Clean Air Act], Congress has not authorized the
Agency to regulate CO2 emissions from motor vehicles to the extent
such standards would effectively regulate the fuel economy of
passenger cars and light duty trucks… At present, the only practical
way to reduce tailpipe emissions of CO2 is to improve fuel
economy…. EPCA is the only statutory vehicle for regulating the fuel
economy of cars and light duty trucks.
68 Fed. Reg. 52922, 52929 (emphasis added).
argument:

The Court rejected this

[T]hat DOT sets mileage standards in no way licenses EPA to shirk its
environmental responsibilities. EPA has been charged with protecting
the public’s ‘health’ and ‘welfare,’ 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), a statutory
obligation wholly independent of DOT’s mandate to promote energy
efficiency. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, § 2(5), 89 Stat.
874, 42 U.S.C. § 6201(5). The two obligations may overlap, but there
is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their
obligations yet avoid inconsistency.
127 S.Ct. at 1462. The Court’s one-paragraph dismissal of an argument that
had occupied a central place in EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions speaks volumes: the Court simply did not buy the idea that fuel
economy standards under EPCA and emissions standards under the Clean
Air Act could not peacefully co-exist. Yet, as I next explain, that discredited
argument appears to be enjoying a renaissance within the Administration.
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II. EISA and the Clean Air Act
Hints abound that the Administration believes that Congress, through
the passage of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”),
undid EPA’s obligation to take action in response to Massachusetts v. EPA.
In announcing his decision to deny California a waiver for its program
regulating greenhouse gases from motor vehicles, for example, EPA
Administrator Stephen Johnson stated that “the solution” to the problem of
climate change “must” extend “far beyond the borders of the California” and
pointedly cited the EISA in concluding that this legislation would “bring a
much needed national approach to addressing global climate change.” Letter
from Stephen Johnson to Arnold Schwarzenegger (December 19, 2007),
available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf. Similarly,
in a letter to Sierra Club attorney David Bookbinder describing EPA’s
response to Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA’s Principal Deputy Assistant
Administrator, Robert J. Meyers, invoked EISA in noting that “EPA is
analyzing how to proceed on the issues before us” on the remand from
Massachusetts v. EPA, and declined to state any “specific timeline for
responding to the remand.” The implication of statements such as these is
that EPA believes that the passage of EISA somehow affected its obligations
on the remand. But EISA did no such thing.
As I have discussed, the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA
that fuel economy standards under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA) and emissions standards under the Clean Air Act may comfortably
co-exist. The portions of the EISA dealing with fuel economy are
amendments to EPCA; they revise EPCA’s existing standards for fuel
economy. EISA, H.R. 6, § 102 (amending 49 U.S.C. § 32902). Just as the
fuel economy standards existing at the time of Massachusetts v. EPA could
exist side-by-side with emissions standards under the Clean Air Act, so too
are the new fuel economy standards called for by EISA fully consistent with
emissions standards under the Clean Air Act. The Court’s opinion was not
dependent on the particular content of the fuel economy standards
themselves, but on the structure of the two statutes in general. That structure
remains compatible with Clean Air Act regulation notwithstanding the
passage of EISA.
Indeed, EISA itself makes clear that Congress had no intention of
erasing or altering EPA’s obligations under the Clean Air Act. Right up4

front, in section 3 of EISA, Congress provided: “Except to the extent
expressly provided in this Act or an amendment made by this Act, nothing in
this Act or an amendment made by this Act supersedes, limits the authority
provided or responsibility conferred by, or authorizes any violation of any
provision of law (including a regulation), including any energy or
environmental law or regulation.” EISA, H.R. 6, § 3. The import of this
provision could not be plainer: EISA simply does not change EPA’s existing
obligations – including those obligations described by the Supreme Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA – under the Clean Air Act. Any suggestion to the
contrary ignores the express text of EISA.
EISA does not in any way change EPA’s obligations on remand from
Massachusetts v. EPA. EISA affects neither EPA’s legal obligations with
respect to determining whether greenhouse gases may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare or the regulatory obligations
that flow from such a determination. This conclusion follows both from the
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA and from the explicit language of EISA.
III. EPA’s Recent Endangerment Finding
On February 29, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson issued the
formal explanation of his previously announced decision to deny California
a waiver for its program regulating greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles. Administrator Johnson concluded that California did not meet the
Clean Air Act’s requirement that, before a waiver may be granted, the State
must have “compelling and extraordinary conditions.” 73 Fed. Reg. 12156.
He explained that California’s problems relating to climate change were not
“compelling and extraordinary” – not because they do not exist, but because
they are no worse than the very bad problems the rest of the country faces as
a result of climate change. 73 Fed. Reg. at 12163-12168. Thus, in the
course of denying California's waiver, the EPA Administrator made explicit,
for the first time, his view that greenhouse gases endanger public health and
welfare.
Administrator Johnson’s decision contains a long discussion of the
effect of greenhouse gases on climate and the effect of climate change on
public health and welfare. The EPA Administrator states that “warming of
the climate system is unequivocal.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 12165. He connects
this warming to manmade greenhouse gases and describes the consequences
of global warming for human health and welfare. For example: “[t]here is
5

strong evidence that global sea level gradually rose in the 20th century and is
currently rising at an increased rate” (73 Fed. Reg. at 12165); “[b]y the end
of the century, globally averaged sea level is projected to rise between 0.18
and 0.59 meters relative to around 1990” (73 Fed. Reg. at 12166); “[i]t is
very likely that heat waves will become more intense, more frequent, and
longer lasting…” (73 Fed. Reg. at 12166); “[i]t is likely that hurricanes will
become more intense…” (73 Fed. Reg. at 12166; “…wildfire and insect
oubreaks are increasing and are likely to intensify…” (73 Fed. Reg. at
12167).
These statements demonstrate that the Administrator has concluded
that greenhouse gases are endangering, and may reasonably be anticipated to
continue to endanger, public health and welfare. For one thing, the
Administrator does not equivocate about existing problems relating to
climate change or about the likelihood of future harms. His findings –
including words such as “unequivocal” and “likely” – easily meet the Clean
Air Act's standard of reasonable anticipation of endangerment. Indeed, the
endangerment standard was amended in 1977 precisely in order to make
clear that scientific certainty (or, to put it another way, “unequivocal”
evidence) was not necessary for a finding of endangerment. Massachusetts
v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1447 n. 7. Moreover, Administrator Johnson’s decision
contains numerous examples of “observed” climate change due to
greenhouse gases (73 Fed. Reg. at 12165-66); no “reasonable anticipation”
is required when harm is already upon us.
In addition, the Administrator's description of the consequences of
climate change relate directly to the key Clean Air Act concepts of public
health and welfare. Hurricanes, wildfires, and the rest all clearly implicate
health and welfare. In addition, regarding public health, the Administrator
states, for example, that the increased magnitude and duration of severe heat
waves will “likely” lead to “increases in mortality and morbidity, especially
among the elderly, young and frail.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 12167. He also
observes that “[c]limate change is expected to lead to increases in ozone
pollution, with associated risks in respiratory infection and aggravation of
asthma,” and that “[o]zone exposure also may contribute to premature death
in people with heart and lung disease.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 12167.1 As for
1

The latter statement is followed by a footnote which instructs: “But see
discussion above.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 12167 n. 65. The reference is
mysterious; nothing in the Administrator’s preceding discussion even relates
6

welfare, the Act broadly defines effects on “welfare” to include – though
they are “not limited to” – “effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation,
manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate,
damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as
well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and wellbeing…” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h). In addition to the heat waves, hurricanes,
wildfires, and insect outbreaks already discussed, the Administrator also
predicts “the spread of invasive species,” the disruption of ecosystem
services, and “significant adverse effects on certain vegetation” due to
increased ozone pollution. 73 Fed. Reg. at 12167. Such findings
indisputably pertain to “welfare” as defined in the Clean Air Act.
These formal conclusions – announced by the EPA Administrator
himself, after notice and opportunity for public comment on the decision
whether to grant a waiver for California’s program (73 Fed. Reg. at 12157) –
amount to a finding of “endangerment” as contemplated in numerous
provisions of the Clean Air Act.
Although the EPA Administrator has stated that his formal factual
findings do not amount to an “endangerment finding” under the Clean Air
Act (73 Fed. Reg. at 12156 n.1), the Administrator may not avoid the legal
and regulatory consequences of his factual findings simply by refusing to
give them the label of “endangerment.” EPA has long acknowledged, and
courts have long agreed, that formal factual findings of the kind made by
EPA in the waiver decision suffice to trigger regulatory obligations under
the Clean Air Act.
In prior administrations, EPA did not even contest the idea that formal
factual conclusions concerning the public health or welfare effects of a
pollutant constituted an endangerment finding under the Clean Air Act. The
regulation of lead provides an instructive example. Before regulating lead as
a fuel additive under section 211 of the Clean Air Act, EPA first found that
lead was endangering public health. 38 Fed. Reg. 33734. EPA was then
faced with a lawsuit arguing that this endangerment finding required EPA to
set air quality standards for lead under section 108 of the Clean Air Act. In
that lawsuit, EPA conceded that lead had an adverse effect on public health
and welfare within the meaning of section 108 of the Act. NRDC v. Train,
to, much less calls into question, the Administrator’s prediction regarding
ozone exposure and premature mortality.
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545 F.2d 320, 324 (2d Cir. 1976). EPA made no attempt to deny that a
formal finding of lead’s harmful effects made pursuant to one provision of
the statute was decisive for purposes of a separate provision of the Act.
EPA’s previous acknowledgment that a formal finding of danger to
public health or welfare amounts to an endangerment finding with regulatory
significance under the Clean Air Act is fully supported in the case law. In
the lawsuit challenging the lead standard for fuel, industry argued that “the
regulations were void because the Administrator had failed to couch his
ultimate finding in the language of the statute itself.” Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
541 F.2d 1, 12 n. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). Calling the argument
“spurious,” the court pointed out that “ultimate findings do not have to be
expressed at all, let alone be expressed in the language of the statute.” 541
F.2d at 12 n.15. In Thomas v. State of New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir.
1986), the court faced the question whether two letters from the EPA
Administrator to public officials, concluding that acid deposition from U.S.
sources was endangering public welfare in Canada, sufficed as a finding that
U.S. emissions were endangering public health or welfare in a foreign
country within the meaning of section 115(a) of the Clean Air Act. The
court said they no; rather, it concluded, the Administrator should have
followed notice-and-comment procedures in issuing his findings. 802 F.2d
at 1447.
Together, these authorities stand for two important propositions.
First, the fact that Administrator Johnson did not label his conclusions an
“endangerment finding” does not dilute their legal significance.
Administrator Johnson used those conclusions as support for a momentous
regulatory decision, that is, the decision denying California and other states
the ability to enact programs to address greenhouse gases from motor
vehicles. The Administrator may not disavow those conclusions in another
legal setting simply because they are inconvenient in that other setting.
Second, procedures matter. Administrator Johnson announced that climate
change is upon us and that its consequences will be harmful, only after
providing notice and an opportunity for public comment. He signed the
announcement himself and published it in the Federal Register. Short of
affixing a wax seal to the document, Johnson could not have made a more
formal announcement about the causes and consequences of climate change
than he did in denying California’s waiver.
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IV. The Regulatory Implications of the Endangerment Finding
The Clean Air Act directs EPA Administrator to regulate numerous
sources of air pollution once he has found that an air pollutant emitted by
them may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court explicitly held that regulation of
motor vehicles under section 202 of the Clean Air Act must follow once the
EPA Administrator makes such an endangerment finding. 127 S.Ct. at 1462.
The same is true for many other sources of air pollution.
Section 111(b)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, for example, provides that
EPA “shall” include on a list a category of stationary sources “if in his
judgment it causes, or contributes significantly to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C.
7411(b)(1)(A). Section 111(b)(1)(B) requires the Administrator to regulate
new sources included on this list. 42 U.S.C. 7411(b)(1)(B). Section 111(d)
requires the Administrator, acting in concert with the States, to regulate
existing sources included on this list. 42 U.S.C. 7411(d). There is little
doubt that many categories of stationary sources – including, for example,
power plants – emit greenhouse gases and thus “cause[]” air pollution which
the Administrator has concluded endangers public health and welfare.
Under section 111, the Administrator “shall” include these sources on a list
and then “shall” regulate them. 42 U.S.C. 7411(b)(1)(A), 7411(b)(1)(B),
7411(d).
Regarding power plants specifically, in 2006, EPA refused to regulate
greenhouse gases from electric utility and several other steam generating
units under section 111 because, the agency explained, “it does not presently
have the authority to regulate CO2 or other greenhouse gases that contribute
to global climate change.” 71 Fed. Reg. 9866, 9869. After Massachusetts v.
EPA, this reasoning is no longer legally valid. The D.C. Circuit has
remanded a challenge to EPA’s decision to the agency. In light of the
reasoning set forth above, EPA must now regulate greenhouse gases from
these sources.
Similarly, section 231(a)(2)(A) provides that the Administrator “shall”
issue proposed standards for “the emission of any air pollutant from any
class or classes of aircraft engines which in his judgment causes, or
contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. 7571(a)(2)(A). Currently
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pending before EPA are two petitions asking EPA to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from aircraft. (California filed one petition, which is available
at
http://cdn.sfgate.com/gate/pictures/2007/12/05/ga_aircraftpet6.pdf.
Environmental
groups
filed
another,
available
at
http://cdn.sfgate.com/gate/pictures/2007/12/05/ga_aircraftghgpet.pdf.)
Provisions regarding the regulation of fuels (42 U.S.C. 7545(c)(1)(A))
and nonroad engines (42 U.S.C. 7547(a)(4)) provide somewhat more
discretion to the Administrator because they state that he “may” rather than
“shall” regulate after a finding of endangerment. Nevertheless, the
Administrator will need to take into account his finding of endangerment in
explaining his course of action under these provisions. Here, too, a petition
to regulate greenhouse gases (in this case, from nonroad engines) awaits a
response
from
EPA.
(The
petition
is
available
at
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_pdfs/press/N1474_Petition.pdf.)
As the Supreme
Court said in Massachusetts v. EPA, in responding to a petition for
rulemaking, the agency’s “reasons for action or inaction must conform to the
authorizing statute,” and EPA must offer a “reasoned explanation” for its
decisions. 127 S.Ct. at 1462, 1463. Thus, the mere existence of some
discretion on the part of EPA, suggested by the inclusion of the word “may”
with respect to regulation of fuels and nonroad engines, does not dilute the
agency’s general obligation to follow statutory criteria and explain its
decisions in reasoned terms.
V. EPA’s Obligation to Make an Endangerment Determination
If, contrary to my belief, the EPA Administrator’s formal factual
findings about the causes and consequences of climate change do not
amount to an endangerment finding triggering an obligation to regulate, then
EPA must issue a decision as to whether endangerment exists in order to
respond to the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. Almost a
year ago, the Supreme Court directed the agency to provide a lawful
explanation as to why it would or would not regulate greenhouse gases from
motor vehicles. The agency’s options, under the Court’s decision, are
limited. So far, however, the agency has not – again, assuming for the
moment that EPA’s findings on the causes and consequences of climate
change do not constitute a finding of “endangerment” – exercised any of the
lawful options presented by the Court. Utter inaction is not one of the
options the Court permitted.
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A little over a month after the Court issued its decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the President issued an Executive Order directing
EPA and the Departments of Transportation and Energy to undertake a
coordinated effort to develop regulations to “protect the environment with
respect to greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, nonroad vehicles,
and nonroad engines.” Executive Order: Cooperation Among Agencies in
Protecting the Environment with Respect to Greenhouse Gas Emissions
From Motor Vehicles, Nonroad Vehicles, and Nonroad Engines (May 14,
2007), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007. At a press
conference announcing the Executive Order, referring to the entire process
of developing final regulations for motor vehicles, President Bush stated that
he had “directed members of [his] administration to complete the process by
the end of 2008.” (A transcript of the press conference is available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070514-4.html.) Yet
here it is, March of 2007, and EPA continues to insist not only that it has
made no endangerment finding but that it need not provide a specific
timeline for doing so.
It has been nine years since the International Center for Technology
Assessment and other groups asked EPA to regulate greenhouse gases from
motor vehicles due to the threat they posed to public health and welfare. In
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, the petitioners had also
waited nine years for an answer to their request that the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration regulate workplace exposures to hexavalent
chromium. The court observed: “[I]n no reported case has a court
reviewed a delay this long without compelling action.” 314 F.3d 143, 152
(3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Under any understanding of the
obligations of an agency not to engage in “unreasonable delay,” EPA has
tarried too long.
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